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Abstract 
China’s development policy since 1978 has differed across regions. With rapid aggregate 
growth has come widening regional inequality. The 1994 fiscal decentralisation reforms shifted 
political pressure onto provincial officials to boost local growth through local public 
investments. These investments affect regional convergence by counteracting regulatory 
frictions in factor accumulation, and can also determine steady-state growth. However, the 
effect of public spending allocations across physical and human capital on growth and 
convergence processes is empirically unexplored for Chinese provinces. We take provincial 
time-series data on public spending by category, finding local public spending and its 
components augment convergence rates differently across regions. Spending on education and 
health contributes significantly more to growth and convergence than capital spending, 
confirming that the public capital-spending bias is not a local growth-optimising strategy. We 
suggest a policy of aligning local government promotion incentives to human capital targets to 
correct local resource misallocation. 
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composition 
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1. Introduction 
It is now over four decades since the reforms of 1978 in China. Between 1978 and 2016, the 
size of China’s economy grew by a multiple of 26, while real GDP per capita quintupled. 
Accompanied as this growth has been by market-oriented reforms, many have looked for 
convergence in income per capita among the regions and provinces of China, following the 
neoclassical prediction that factors flow to poorer areas in search of the highest marginal 
returns. Compared with cross-country samples, such convergence seems a priori more likely 
among regions within countries, often argued to be more homogeneous in preferences, 
institutions and technology (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1999; Gennaioli et al, 2014). 
However, China’s rapid growth conceals a widening regional disparity in economic 
development (Table 1).1  Our interest is in the role of local public spending in this phenomenon, 
particularly in the period following fiscal reforms in 1994. Official classification of provinces 
separates them into three geo-economic regions; Coastal, Middle, and Western (Figure 1). We 
depict below in Figure 2a how the coastal regions of China have pulled away from the rest 
since 1970. Another way of thinking about this is to compare average real GDP per capita in 
each region relative to Shanghai in 1990 and in 2016. This is seen in Figure 3a. Average real 
GDP per capita in the coastal region moves closer to the Shanghai level in 2016 than in the 
other two regions. This illustrates the fact that average GDP per capita in the coastal region 
grew faster than the average for the middle and western regions. Figure 3b shows the ratio of 
government spending to GDP by each region for 1997 (the year that full fiscal data is available 
for all provinces) and 2016. The share of government spending in each region rises between 
1997 and 2016 but the rise is particularly pronounced in the western region.  
Since the 1994 reforms, most public expenditure responsibility lies at the local government 
level via the heavily decentralised fiscal system. Central government prefers to correct regional 
inequality through this mechanism rather than by special resource transfers to poor areas, which 
may appear to reward failure while reducing growth in richer provinces (Dollar and Hofman, 
2008; Chen, 2010). Significant pressure to show local growth improvements therefore now 
falls on provincial officials, and officials in poorer regions are challenged to enhance local 
growth and facilitate catch-up through their spending decisions. 
In this paper, we investigate the importance of local government spending in the dynamics of 
beta-convergence (‘catch-up’) in real income per capita growth between 1991 and 2016 for 31 
provinces in China. We ask two related questions about club-convergence in China. First, does 
local fiscal expenditure help or hinder growth and convergence, if indeed it plays a role at all? 
Second, what type of public spending has had the greatest effect on growth and convergence 
rates? We have not discovered other studies that do this for China at the province level. 
In a modified Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) framework, we allow a role for provincial 
government spending in dynamic growth and convergence. We further examine whether this 
role differs across different categories of spending and across three geographical regions of 
 
1 While real income per person grew at an average rate of 9 percent annually between 1978 and 2016, the growth rates of the 
fastest- and slowest-growing provinces were 10.9 per cent and 7.2 per cent respectively. 
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China, looking for evidence of regional convergence clubs in terms of club-specific steady 
states and convergence rates. 
Our hypothesis is that government spending counteracts frictions in the accumulation of 
diminishing returns factors driving convergence in the Neo-classical growth model (cf. 
Gennaioli et al., 2014).  In China, insufficient market incentives slow private sector investment-
driven capital accumulation within the province, while restrictions on cross-border capital 
movements slow convergence through capital seeking higher returns. Such frictions are both 
alleviated by provincial government spending, both overall and targeted towards certain types 
of investment. Particularly interesting is spending on education and healthcare, i.e. human 
capital investment2 . Many studies have investigated the regional or cross-country income 
convergence effects of migration barriers restricting human capital flows (e.g. Delogu et al, 
2018). Regulatory restrictions on worker movements (hukou) undermine human capital 
mobility within China (Cai et al. 2002). Public investments in human capital accumulation in 
situ therefore become more important in supporting regional convergence in the particular 
context of China. 
We also give a role to provincial government spending as a steady-state determinant of 
dynamic growth, following the endogenous growth literature (Barro, 1990; Futagami et al, 
1993). This is appropriate for China’s managed market economy with provincially 
decentralised spending.3 The still-significant share of the public sector in China’s provincial 
economies make public resource allocation a key consideration for the supply side.  
A key contribution of this study is the emphasis on public spending allocation across categories, 
following the literature on imbalances arising due to political incentive structures. Promotion 
possibilities for provincial government officials within the Communist party hierarchy are 
aligned principally with GDP per capita in their jurisdiction (Li and Zhou, 2005; Xu, 2011).4 
Where local officials have discretion, such incentives may affect how funds are allocated across 
categories. Key public spending categories in this context are i) public investments in physical 
capital and infrastructure (often referred to as ‘capital spending’) and ii) spending on public 
goods like healthcare and education. Time series plots of these key spending categories for our 
dataset are provided in Figure 8 below (see Section 3.3). The point of contention is whether 
this second category constitutes government consumption (i.e. ‘welfare transfers’) or 
productive investment. 
It has been noted elsewhere that if public spending types differ in growth-augmenting potential, 
the objective of local officials to maximise local growth may deviate from local residents’ 
 
2 Human capital is an intangible asset embodied in workers, reflecting worker quality or capacity in production. 
These cover (at the very least) basic health and skills. Here we focus on its accumulation via investments in 
publicly funded education and healthcare. 
3 Tax rate-setting and revenue-allocating powers remain with the central government. However, the spending side 
of the provincial budget constraint is not strictly tied to local tax revenue. 
4 As well as specific targets such as economic construction (Tsui and Wang, 2004). Party literature suggests that 
such targets account for 60-70% of performance evaluation, with the remainder linked to factors such as political 
loyalty (See Xu, 2011). 
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utility, leading to capital spending biases and welfare-inferior outcomes (Jia et al, 2014; Yin 
and Zhu, 2012). This literature recognises the welfare value of education and healthcare 
provision as a consumption good but ignores its productive value, while capital and 
construction spending are viewed as the most important growth-driver by local officials (Yin 
and Zhu, 2012, Li and Liu, 2011). There is, however, a strong case for spending on health and 
education to play a role in China’s provincial growth process via the accumulation of human 
capital (Fleisher et al. 2010). If provincial officials target maximum growth but have in mind 
the wrong growth model (ignoring the productive value of education and healthcare, for 
example), public spending allocations across categories could then be distorted even from the 
optimal growth perspective. Moreover, following Devarajan et al. (1997), if human and 
physical capital have low substitutability then reallocating public spending towards human 
capital may be a growth-enhancing policy even if its direct production elasticity is lower.  
In this paper we exploit provincial time-series data on public spending broken down by 
category, and as yet under-investigated in the empirical literature on China, to investigate the 
role of provincial public spending in convergence and growth. We explore whether, in this 
dataset, the bias in local public spending towards physical capital represents a dynamic 
misallocation of resources, with implications for regional convergence and growth. The 
purpose of this line of inquiry is to recommend an improved set of promotion incentives for 
local government officials in China that align local spending decisions better with the 
sustainable growth and welfare goals of the country.  
On beta-convergence, our results confirm the consensus finding of regional club-convergence. 
However, we show that local public spending and, moreover, the composition of public 
spending affects growth in the short-term and aids convergence with differential effects across 
regions 5 . We find that so-called ‘welfare’ spending on education and health contributes 
significantly more to growth and convergence than capital spending, in line with related work 
on human capital-driven growth in China (e.g. Fleisher et al. 2010; and Zhu et al, 2014). This 
undermines the logic driving the well-known bias in public capital spending arising in the 
pursuit of maximum growth by local officials.  
Given the result that human capital spending dominates capital and infrastructure spending in 
terms of growth and convergence effects, the policy recommendation is a rebalancing of public 
spending towards the former. In practice, this requires the integration of human capital 
investment targets into Party promotion procedures.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses literature on fiscal 
policy, capital-bias and provincial growth convergence in China. Section 3 discusses data, 
sigma-convergence and the categories of fiscal spending. Empirical work follows in Section 4, 
including robustness tests for cross-sectional dependence and alternative clustering (clubs). 
Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
5 For full characterisation of our data on public spending and its composition, see Section 3.3 and Appendix A. 
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Table 1 here 
Figure 1 here 
Figure 2a and 2b here 
Figure3a and 3b here 
Provincial growth-convergence and fiscal policy in China 
A large empirical literature investigates growth convergence among countries and regions 
following the predictions of the Neo-classical growth model (NCGM); for regions, this starts 
with Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). We preface this discussion with a brief recap of the 
theory. 
In the NCGM, since the transitional growth rate depends on the initial income level, poorer 
economies grow faster than rich economies and ‘catch up’, provided they share a steady state. 
This beta-convergence follows from diminishing returns to factors of production as they 
accumulate. However, steady-state determinants including TFP endowments may vary across 
economies. Conditional convergence then depends on the distance of each economy from its 
own steady state. While long-run income per capita will not equalise, the distribution stabilises 
once all economies reach steady-state if all share an exogenous TFP growth rate. Sigma-
convergence is the narrowing of the cross-economy income distribution over time, a natural 
corollary of transitional beta-convergence.  
It may be that a large group of economies do not share a rate of convergence, even 
conditionally. However, convergence ‘clubs’ may exist, a club being a subgroup of economies 
which converge at the same rate to their steady state(s). Conditional factors capture 
heterogeneous steady states, while club-convergence captures heterogeneity in convergence 
rates along transition; clubs may also share steady-state conditioning features. 
Our focus is on the role of local public spending in driving club convergence, nevertheless, we 
provide a brief review of empirical literature on provincial income convergence and regional 
clubs in China which has informed our modelling choices. There is some diversity of findings 
regarding provincial beta-convergence in China, depending on the samples and methodologies 
adopted, as well as on the theoretical framework within which empirical results are interpreted. 
Tian et al. (2016) provide a good overview.  
Consensus exists for gradual convergence over the period 1953-1978, prior to the Open Door 
policy reforms (Maasoumi and Wang, 2008; Weeks and Yao, 2003). The post-reform period 
from 1978 to the early 1990s then saw widening provincial inequality as regional growth 
performances diverged due to regionally preferential government policy.6 The literature has 
therefore focused on club-convergence post-1978. Until 1990, the fast growth of coastal 
provinces reduced income dispersion at the top of the distribution, as they approached the 
 
6 See, among others, Yang (2002), Chang (2002), Wan and Zhang (2006), Andersson et al. (2013), Fleisher et al. 
(2010), and  Pedroni and Yao(2006). We do not focus on the extensive rural-urban gap literature here; for 
discussion, see (Zhang et al. 2011). 
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richest provinces from below in per capita level terms (Démurger, 2001). However, coastal 
growth rates appear to have accelerated after 1990, prompting strong sigma-divergence across 
provinces and regions (Figures 3-6). In an augmented NCGM framework, Fleisher and Chen 
(1997) find beta-convergence in GDP per capita for 25 provinces, 1978-93, conditional on 
significant regional TFP differences, investment shares and employment growth. They find 
that foreign direct investment (FDI) and human capital explain much of the large implied coast-
non-coast TFP gap.7  
More recently, Anderson et al. (2013) use time-series decomposition to show long-run 
provincial convergence over 1978-2009 but find short- to medium-run divergence between 
coastal and non-coastal provinces. Using entropy measures to investigate convergence in 
growth rates across provinces and within-time cluster analysis to identify clubs, Maasoumi and 
Wang (2008) reject nationwide convergence but find convergence clubs for both pre- and post-
reform periods for 1953-2003 data. Tian et al. (2016) apply the logt test of Phillips and Sul 
(2007) and identify two clusters of provinces in contrast to the widely accepted three; for 1978-
2012 they find no evidence of convergence for the whole economy but strong evidence of club 
convergence. Zhang, Fu and Ju (2019) use time-series methods to investigate club convergence 
in income per capita among the counties of Henan province. To reiterate, our interest here is in 
the role of public spending and its components in convergence and growth across Chinese 
provinces8.  
Building on the empirical literature on neoclassical convergence in China, therefore, the 
contribution of the present study is to consider the role of government spending in that process, 
exploiting provincial data on public spending overall and by category. First, we propose a 
convergence-enhancing effect for government spending within a modified NCGM, following 
a logic similar to Gennaioli et al. (2014). They explore regional convergence and the role of 
capital movements across regions in the presence of marginal product differentials, adding an 
exogenous mobility friction varying across economies. Mobility frictions impede capital from 
accumulating where relative marginal products alone would predict, and therefore reduce the 
regional convergence speed in GDP per capita. In a panel of 83 countries (1,528 regions), they 
find evidence for slow regional convergence within-country, due to various proxies for national 
market institutions and government transfers included as interaction variables with lagged 
regional GDP.  
 
7 In a similar framework, Démurger (2001) explains regional disparities in terms of openness, geography, and 
infrastructure endowments resulting from the pre-reform era, again emphasizing coast-non coast differences. See 
also Yao and Zhang (2001b) and Choi and Li (2000). 
8 For an application of time-series methods to club convergence in state-local public expenditure across US states 
for 1957 to 2008, see Mahdavi and Westerlund (2017). The length of our annual dataset on public spending 
components does not make such an approach viable here, though it is a direction for future work as more data 
becomes available. Mahdavi and Westerlund (2017) emphasise the importance of local public spending for 
regional growth and income convergence in the US, the issue we address here for China. 
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In the context of provincial convergence in China, this mechanism seems relevant; in particular, 
regional human capital mobility (a convergence-promoting force) is severely restricted by the 
hukou system. We contend that local government spending on education and healthcare would 
counteract the effect of such frictions, increasing the rate at which economies within regional 
‘clubs’ converge to steady state. 
Moving away from the NCGM, if TFP growth rates vary endogenously based on local features 
or variables then each economy may have a different long-run growth path; even so, they may 
converge to their own growth path at the same rate as others in their club. However, the 
implications for the income distribution over time (i.e., sigma-convergence) are then less clear. 
If policy variables are robustly related to long-run TFP growth determinants, reforms can have 
a significant impact on the long-run distribution. 
Since Arrow and Kurz (1970), a strand of growth theory has allowed government investments 
a role in the production side of the economy such that they affect convergence to steady state, 
or endogenously determine the long-run growth rate (Barro, 1990). In Barro (1990), 
government spending is productive (hence a growth determinant) if it enters the production 
function as an input complementary with private capital, or non-productive if it appears as a 
consumption good in the household utility function (hence negatively associated with growth 
via taxation).  Devarajan et al. (1997) allow for two or more types of government spending, all 
inputs to final production and complementary with private capital. A shift in the mix between 
types of government expenditure affects the long-term growth rate, however. Expenditure types 
are denoted ‘productive’ (‘unproductive’) depending on whether a marginal change in the share 
of one increases (decreases) the growth rate. The direction depends on initial spending shares 
relative to their optimal level, which in turn rests on the production substitutability of inputs: a 
marginal increase in one investment type will not increase growth if its share of resources is 
already ‘too high.’ The takeaway for our context is that public spending skewed indefinitely 
towards one type of capital investment may lead to suboptimal growth outcomes. We address 
this directly in our model. 
Empirical studies on government spending composition categorise public spending into 
productive and non-productive types. Productive spending generally includes all infrastructure 
spending and physical capital investment but might or might not include spending on healthcare 
and education. Several recent studies on the public spending mix find in favour of a growth-
boosting effect from reallocation of spending towards education and welfare (Gupta et al. 2005; 
Gemmell et al. 2014; Fournier and Johanson, 2016), including Bose et al. (2007) who 
investigate ratios of spending types to GDP in the context of developing economies and find 
the strongest effects from education spending. However, in China the perception of government 
spending on healthcare and education as ‘productive’ is far from universal; physical capital  is 
regarded as the dominant source of China’s growth (Yusuph et al. 2007) and public spending 
on physical capital and infrastructure is still the commonly preferred stimulus. A strand of 
political economy literature investigates this capital bias in Chinese local public spending (see 
Jia et al. 2014).  
Yin and Zhu (2012) differentiate between two types of government spending (productive vs 
consumption) in a Barro (1990)-type growth model. Local officials set the share of productive 
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expenditure to optimise their promotion opportunities which are, in turn, closely linked to the 
local growth rate. They target maximum economic growth, resulting in a spending bias towards 
‘productive’ capital. The spending misallocation results in a welfare distortion from the local 
resident perspective, but the strategy is assumed to maximise growth.  
In Yin and Zhu's (2012) analysis, spending on healthcare and education is explicitly perceived 
by the official as government consumption. This perception conflicts with evidence relating 
human capital investment to provincial growth and convergence, both for developing 
economies and for China. Such a link may rest on neoclassical-type factor accumulation or on 
externalities to human capital investments. Fleisher et al. (2010) investigate human capital 
driven TFP growth and regional inequality in China. In their framework, human capital affects 
TFP growth both directly (through purposeful innovation activity) and indirectly (via spill over 
to TFP growth); cf Benhabib and Spiegel (1994). Human capital accumulation can aid TFP 
adoption and diffusion, hence promoting convergence in TFP and income per capita (Nelson 
and Phelps, 1966). Fleisher et al. (2010) argue that systematically preferential government 
policy has created inequality between coastal provinces and other regions; policy projections 
of direct government investment in human capital in non-coastal regions show significantly 
reduced inequality. Notably, they find similar effects for direct government investment in 
infrastructure, concluding that policy can play a significant role in correcting regional 
inequality.9 
In this paper, we contribute to a growing research literature on the role of government spending 
on growth, and growth convergence. We focus on the relationship of local government 
spending and composition of spending with growth and growth convergence, a question not 
yet addressed for the provinces of China.  
 
3. Stylised Facts and Data 
3.1 Overview 
Our regional focus is motivated by past preferential central government economic policy, 
differentiated by region (Figure 1; see Appendix for province-region list). The clearly-labelled 
‘Coastal Area Development Strategy’ advantaged the coastal region most strongly from 1978 
until the early 1990s, when benefits began to extend towards the interior.10 There is clear 
evidence that provinces entered the 1990s with regionally distinct endowments of 
infrastructure, capital inputs, FDI and TFP (Démurger, 2001; Westerlund et al., 2010; Fleisher 
et al., 2010; Andersson et al., 2013), leading us to expect different long-run growth paths by 
region. Furthermore, the government’s initial clustering of provinces rested on geographical 
features that lead marginal products to differ significantly by region (Démurger et al., 2002). 
We therefore adopt the official geographical demarcation of provinces into regions, coastal 
 
9 Our empirical work is reduced form and may pick up effects of this nature. 
10 Only from 2000 was a Western Development Region Strategy launched, with underwhelming effects on 
regional inequality (Grewal and Ahmed, 2011). 
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region 1 being the most developed and western region 3 the least developed. Figure 2, panels 
A and B, reveals distinct paths for income per capita in the three regions. Figure 2A shows that 
since 1990, the coastal provinces as a geo-economic group grew faster than the all-province 
average in terms of real GDP per capita (our calculations reveal that coastal provinces grew by 
almost 1% faster per annum). Figure 2B shows distinct patterns for the average GDP per capita 
of the Western and Middle regions relative to average GDP per capita of the coastal region; 
only in recent years do they start to catch up. Sigma-convergence is also discernible by geo-
economic region (Section 3.2). Against this regional backdrop, we are interested in whether 
local government spending policy is related to the growth and convergence rates of provinces 
or regional clubs. 
All data are obtained from a single online source; Epsnet in association with WIND 
(http://www.epsnet.com.cn/) and manipulated according to instructions in the Manual of 
government budgetary accounts reform of the Ministry of Finance, China. Table 2 shows 
descriptive statistics of real GDP and total government spending as a proportion of GDP by all 
provinces and regions. Notably, maximum public spending over GDP is above unity in some 
provinces, particularly in poorer Western provinces such as Tibet. This is partly a scale effect, 
since transfers from the centre are high in region 3 relative to its low GDP. We discuss the 
breakdown of provincial government spending by category in Section 3.3. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
3.2 Sigma-Convergence  
As a preliminary to our regional analysis of the role of public spending in provincial club beta-
convergence, we investigate sigma-convergence overall and broken down by region. This 
analysis provides further support for the chosen regional classification and motivates our 
empirical modelling choices in Section 4. 
Though much of the convergence literature focusses on beta-convergence, this is well-known 
not to be a sufficient condition for sigma-convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). Indeed, 
sigma-convergence is equally interesting as it provides a direct picture of the regional income 
distribution (Quah, 1993; Friedman, 1992). Following this line of reasoning, we first report the 
distribution of real GDP per capita across all provinces for the period 1978-2016. Figure 4 plots 
the year-on-year cross-sectional standard deviation of the logarithm of real GDP per capita 
across all provinces. Three distinct regimes seem apparent: sigma-convergence from 1978 to 
the early 1990s, then divergence until 2006, and convergence for 2006-2016. These dates mark 
significant changes of direction in central government policy: Deng Xiaoping’s South Trip in 
1992 and the Party Congress in 1993 set in motion reforms to nation-wide institutions to align 
incentive structures with market socialism (e.g. reforms to fiscal and financial systems and to 
the state-owned sector), reforms not restricted to coastal provinces. In 2006, Harmonious 
Society was added as a State Policy goal (Hofman and Wu, 2009), marking a formal 
acknowledgement of inequality issues. It is likely that this post-2006 policy shift has 
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manifested through the fiscal decentralisation system11, and this leads us consider local public 
spending as a driver of regional growth and club-convergence. 
Figure 4 here 
Figures 5-7 plot dispersion measures separately for the three regions. These figures indicate 
clear heterogeneity in growth convergence across regions and within regions over time. Our 
hypothesis is that province-level government spending plays a role in generating these patterns, 
and this is the subject of our empirical investigation in Section 4.  
 
Figures 5 – 7 here 
3.3 Regional Spending and its Composition: 
We now turn to the measures of public spending, its composition and transfers from central to 
regional government levels. These are the key variables of interest in our study and we focus 
on their role in provincial growth and club-convergence. 
China has a decentralised fiscal system along with a highly centralised political system. On its 
path to a market-oriented economy, China has gone through a series of reforms to its economic 
and financial institutions. Fiscal relations between the central and provincial governments have 
similarly undergone reform, principally to the revenue-sharing rules. Tax revenues were 
centralised in 1994 with the share of revenues remitted to the centre from the provinces rising 
from an average of 22.0% in 1993 to 55.7% in 1994 (Jia et al. 2014). Revenue centralisation 
has left local governments fewer direct resources, while their spending responsibilities have 
increased. The fiscal gaps arising from this process are plugged partly by transfers from the 
centre to provincial governments.  
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on government spending as proportion of local GDP 
decomposed into ‘productive’ capital spending, and ‘welfare’ spending (education and 
health) 12 . Greater detail on this breakdown is provided in Appendix A (Table A2). In 
categorising fiscal expenditure, we follow the nomenclature often used in the literature on 
Chinese public spending categories and capital-bias (see Section 2), separating it into 
‘productive’ and ‘welfare’ categories, with the remainder going on ‘maintenance.’  Broadly 
stated, ‘productive’ expenditure is capital spending; welfare relates to education and health 
(public human capital investment). The remainder, ‘maintenance,’ is predominantly spending 
on foreign affairs, defence and public security. Table 3 also shows the transfers from central 
 
11 For discussions of fiscal decentralisation and provincial growth and inequality, see Jin and Hou (2005) and 
Zhang (2006). On the relationship between provincial inequality and growth more broadly, see Wan et al. (2006) 
and Chen (2010). 
12 The public budgetary account experienced a major reform in 2007. In order to bridge the data of budget items 
throughout the reform, we follow the instruction in Manual of government budgetary accounts reform of the 
Ministry of Finance, China. See further discussion in Appendix A. 
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government to the provincial governments in the form revenue rebates, which account for 
spatially redistributive transfers. 
 
Table 3 here 
 
What is clear from Table 3 is the high rate of rebates and transfers from the centre to the 
Western regions indicating the redistributive policies of the government across space, but also 
the higher rates of ‘productive’ and ‘welfare’ spending partly through higher spending and 
lower GDP per capita. 
Figure 8 (Panels A to C) provides times series plots by region for total spending and for 
‘productive’ and ‘welfare’ components, all as proportions to GDP. As these plots indicate, 
capital and infrastructure spending tend to dominate the ‘welfare’ category for most of the 
sample. 
Figure 8 (Panels A to C) here 
 
4. Empirical work 
4.1 Econometric specifications  
Here we model the short-run growth and convergence effects of total provincial government 
expenditure and its ‘productive’ and ‘welfare’ components. We first estimate a benchmark 
model of provincial growth convergence with and without regional heterogeneity but excluding 
fiscal expenditure and composition. In the second stage, we explicitly allow growth and 
convergence-augmenting roles for total fiscal expenditure and its components at province level, 
allowing for regional heterogeneity.  
Following the basic NCGM, the growth rate of income per capita in transition towards steady 
state depends positively on the steady state itself (call this x) and negatively on the starting 
level: 
∆𝑦𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽𝑦𝑖,0 
Where 𝑦𝑖 is the log of income per capita, and ∆ is the difference operator. The steady state 
depends on the long run investment rates in relevant factors of production presumed fixed over 
the long-run and on the long-run behaviour of TFP, which may itself have endogenous 
determinants (including capital externalities; see Chen et al. 2014).13 The first stage benchmark 
 
13 Our regression model is a reduced form which may capture effects consistent with several growth models, such 
as those in which capital spill-overs drive growth or TFP-convergence (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Fleisher et 
al., 2010). We do not claim to test a specific growth model conclusively, but to provide evidence for a government-
spending channel for growth and convergence in China. 
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model allows for dynamics that may exist empirically but not specified in theory. The basic 
equation is:  
   
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝐷1 + 𝛾2𝐷2 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝜑1𝐷1 ∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝜑2𝐷2 ∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (1) 
 
where ity  is the log of provincial ( 1, 2,....,30i = ) real per capita GDP, 1D  and 2D  are dummy 
variables taking a value of unity for regions one (coastal) and two (mid-central), respectively, 
and zero otherwise; these capture regional differences in steady state growth.14 The lagged 
dependent variable captures dynamics. A negative and significant  coupled with 
insignificant 𝜑1  and 𝜑2  imply homogeneous growth convergence across all 31 Chinese 
provinces. However, statistically significant
1 , 𝜑1  and 𝜑2 such that 𝜑1 ≠ 𝜑2  imply 
heterogeneity in convergence across the coastal, middle and western regions. As argued in 
Barro (2015), the ‘Hurwicz bias’ associated with fixed effects can bias convergence estimates 
upwards (cf. Gennaioli et al. 2014).  Hence, we avoid fixed provincial effects and use regional 
dummies to identify coastal and mid-central provinces as separate regional clubs. Exclusion 
restrictions on these dummy variables and their interactions reduce equation (1) to a benchmark 
model of provincial convergence. 15 
We can rewrite equation (1) distinguishing steady state factors from convergence effects as: 
 ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = (𝛼0 + 𝛾1𝐷1 + 𝛾2𝐷2) + (𝛽1 + 𝜑1𝐷1 + 𝜑2𝐷2) ∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛼1∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (1a) 
To assess the role of total government expenditure and of ‘productive’ and ‘welfare’ 
components in provincial growth and convergence, we augment specification (1) as follows: 
   
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝐷1 + 𝛾2𝐷2 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝜆1𝐸𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝜆2𝐸𝑖𝑡−2 ∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝜅1𝐷1 ∗ 𝐸𝑖𝑡−2
∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝜅2𝐷2 ∗ 𝐸𝑖𝑡−2 ∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                     (2) 
 
In equation (2), ,( , )it it it itE g p w where itg ,  itp  and itw  denote, respectively, total provincial 
government expenditure and its productive and welfare spending components, all ratios to 
provincial GDP. We can rewrite equation (2) for ease of interpretation within the growth 
 
14 Cf Yao and Zhang, 2001b. 
15 The regional dummy variables control for geographical differences as well as conditioning variables commonly 
used for the pre-1990 period in the literature, which resulted in regionally different endowments of e.g. physical 
and knowledge capital due to FDI (Démurger, 2001). This model does not allow directly for technological spill-
overs between provinces (cf. Kim, 2019). This may be an angle for future work. To an extent, regional dummy 
interactions should capture spatial effects in the model. 
 
1
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framework ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖?̌? + 𝛽𝑦𝑖𝑡−2, where the dynamic steady state 𝑥𝑖?̌? of province i is composed 
of a constant shared at the regional level (for regions k=1,2,3) and a variable part depending 
on province-level government spending  (i.e. 𝑥𝑖?̌? = 𝑥𝑘 + 𝑥𝑖,𝑡): 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = (𝛼0 + 𝛾1𝐷1 + 𝛾2𝐷2 + 𝜆1𝐸𝑖𝑡−2) + (𝛽1 + 𝜆2𝐸𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝜅1𝐷1𝐸𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝜅2𝐷2𝐸𝑖𝑡−2) ∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2
+ 𝛼1∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                     (2a) 
 
We thus allow for all three types of government expenditures to exert dynamic growth effects, 
as well as convergence-augmenting effects16, following the theoretical discussion of Section 
2.17 
Estimating the effects of these fiscal expenditure variables in turn, a positive and significant 1  
implies the expenditure measure in question is a relevant steady-state conditioning variable, 
while negative 2 ,  𝜅1  and 𝜅2  support convergence effects. Statistically significant 1 2   
imply heterogeneous convergence effects of expenditure flows across region-clubs. An 
additional area of heterogeneity is 𝜆2𝐸𝑖𝑡−2, where government spending as a proportion of local 
GDP will vary for each province. As before, region-specific conditioning constants capture 
steady-state features shared by club-members (𝛾1, 𝛾2). 
 
4.2 Estimation Methods: 
We first apply OLS in a panel framework with clustering to address intra-province error 
correlation. Although OLS with clustering is simple and intuitively appealing, nonetheless, it 
leaves the issues of endogeneity and cross-sectional dependence open. The conventional IV 
(instrumental variable) estimator is consistent under endogeneity if the instruments used are 
relevant and orthogonal to residuals. It nevertheless becomes inefficient under 
heteroscedasticity, an omnipresent issue in panel regressions. In this situation, the prevailing 
popular approach in addressing endogeneity as well as heteroscedasticity of unknown form in 
a panel is the generalized method of moments (GMM) of Hansen (1982). Pagan and Hall (1983) 
propose a test of heteroscedasticity valid in IV regressions which helps decide between the 
conventional IV or GMM estimators. If the Pagan and Hall test suggests heteroscedasticity in 
the conventional IV regressions, then GMM is preferable. However, instrument relevance and 
validity are equally pertinent to the GMM estimator. In specifications (1) and (2), the suspect 
 
16 We emphasise the explanation of friction-reducing effects on broad capital accumulation for the neoclassical 
convergence effect, though this framework could also accommodate convergence effects occurring in an 
endogenous growth framework with leaders and followers, via an impact of local government spending on TFP 
adoption and regional diffusion (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1997; also discussion in Section 2 regarding 
human capital). 
17  Our categorisation of public spending includes under ‘productive’ many types of spending that could 
potentially have innovation and TFP effects e.g. spending on science and technology promotion. If present, we 
would expect such spill-overs to boost the estimated effects of productive spending in the regressions.  
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endogenous regressor is the lagged dependent variable. 18 As a precursor, we employed the 
conventional IV estimators but ultimately preferred GMM due to significant heteroscedasticity 
(Pagan and Hall test results available on request).  
Two variants of GMM estimators are popular in the empirical panel literature. One is the 
dynamic panel data (DPD) system GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and 
Bond, 1998) which stacks the first difference and level data and uses progressively increasing 
internally generated instruments to address endogeneity. This estimator is consistent and 
efficient under certain moment conditions. However, it quickly runs into the problem of 
instrument glut, compromising its efficiency. Nevertheless, there are ways to truncate the 
number of internally generated instruments. 
The second type is the feasible efficient two-step GMM estimator which, unlike system GMM, 
uses instruments analogous to that of the generalized instrumental variable estimator (GIVE) 
but exploit the optimal weighting matrix that minimizes the asymptotic variance of the 
estimator (see Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) and Hayashi (2000) for discussion). The 
efficiency gain relative to conventional IV/GIVE estimators is derived from the optimal 
weighting matrix, over-identifying restrictions, and relaxation of the i.i.d. assumption. A 
variety of two-step feasible GMM procedures exist in the literature, essentially differing on the 
methods of computing residual series for the weighting matrix. The most prominent are the 
arbitrary heteroscedasticity-robust variant (Hayashi, 2000; Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, p. 
599), continuously updated GMM (Hansen et al. 1996), and the feasible efficient two-step 
GMM with clustering (White 1984, Wooldridge, 2002), all of which produce efficient 
coefficient estimates and consistent standard errors. Here we employ the system GMM as well 
as these three feasible efficient two-step GMM estimators, for the sake of robustness. However, 
we attach more importance to feasible efficient two-step GMM with clustering. Finally, we 
also assess the robustness of our GMM results to cross-sectional dependence by employing the 
pooled mean group estimator (PMGCD) proposed by Chudik and Pesaran (2015) and Chudik 
et al. (2016). PMGCD allows for complete cross-sectional parameter heterogeneity and cross-
sectional dependence in panel estimation. 
 
4.3 Results 
All three feasible efficient two-step GMM estimators produce very similar results for models 
(1) and (2) above. The system GMM estimator, on the other hand, produced qualitatively 
similar parameter estimates but often failed the over-identifying test of instrument validity 
irrespective of our attempts to truncate the number of instruments. This failure of instrument 
validity in our dataset compromises the soundness of system GMM estimates.  Hence, we focus 
on results based on feasible efficient two-step GMM with clustering.  
 
18 Economic theory also guides us that local government expenditure may respond to expected future growth in 
a feed-forward framework. However, in our specification the fiscal policy measures enter with a lag of two years 
hence the endogeneity of fiscal measures is less of an issue.  
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Table 4 presents the first stage regression results. Columns 1 and 3 report OLS results with 
cluster-robust standard errors across 31 provinces, with and without regional heterogeneity in 
convergence rates. Columns 2 and 4 report results from the efficient two-step GMM estimator 
robust to intra-region error clustering and arbitrary heteroscedasticity.19  
 
Table 4 here 
 
In Table 4, columns 1 and 2, where all 31 provinces are assumed to converge homogenously, 
results show slow global convergence; we attach more credence to GMM estimates. The 
convergence parameter (
1 ) is negative and significant. However, allowing for regional 
heterogeneity in convergence, OLS estimates (column 3) suggest club-convergence for Eastern 
and Mid-Central regions (in terms of shared steady-state conditions and a distinct convergence 
rate for club members) but no convergence in the Western region. Our preferred GMM results 
show club-convergence for region 1 only (column 4). Sanderson-Windmeijer (2015) tests of 
model under-identification (UIT) and weak identification (WIT) both reject the respective null 
hypotheses, suggesting that the instrumental variables used are valid and relevant; additionally, 
the J statistic cannot reject the null of orthogonal instruments. Thus, our efficient two-step 
GMM estimates pass all the relevant diagnostics.  
Overall, the benchmark model reveals a slow but significant convergence across all 31 Chinese 
provinces when regional heterogeneity is not modelled explicitly. However, once regional 
heterogeneity is allowed for, we find club convergence only among coastal provinces. No club 
convergence is detected robustly for regions 2 or 3 in this 1991-2016 sample.  
We now turn to the regression results incorporating government spending and its composition 
(Table 5). GMM estimates in column 2 relate general government spending scaled by GDP 
positively to growth and indicate that it speeds up convergence. While 𝛽1  is positive and 
significant, the remaining three convergence parameters associated with government spending 
are all negatively signed and significant, implying that general government spending reinforces 
convergence with regional and provincial heterogeneity. This is seen more clearly where the  
speed of convergence is defined by the term [
𝛽1+𝜆2𝐸𝑖𝑡−2+𝜅1𝐷1𝐸𝑖𝑡−2+𝜅2𝐷2𝐸𝑖𝑡−2
1−𝛼1
], which shows that 
the heterogeneity is not only region-specific, defined by the geographical club, but also 
province-specific, defined by the provincial level fiscal expenditure-GDP ratio. Using the 
above expression, the long-run convergence parameters for 2016 values of total government 
spending per GDP by province gives regional averages of -.015 for the Coastal region, -.014 
for the Mid region, and -.009 for the Western region. This result says that in 2016 the Western 
region was converging marginally slower than the other two.   
 
 
19 Reported results are also robust to continuously updated GMM and the Feasible Efficient two-step GMM 
Estimator. 
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Table 5 here 
 
Columns 4 and 6 show results isolating ‘productive’ spending and ‘welfare’ spending 
separately. It is evident that both spending types are related to growth and convergence.20 All 
GMM estimates reported in Table 5 pass two diagnostics (UIT and WIT) of model 
identification. However, J statistic marginally rejects the null of orthogonal instruments for 
total government spending, whereas it significantly rejects for the productive spending. The J 
statistic tests for the full set (both included and excluded) of instruments, so does not 
necessarily pin down the rejection to excluded instruments. Hence, in our context, UIT and 
WIT are more relevant tests than the J test. The results of Table 5 show that ‘productive’ and 
‘welfare’ spending contribute to growth convergence, but they also provide insight into the 
discussion on the relative growth effects of provincial government spending types and the 
capital bias. Evaluating the estimated effects of ‘productive’ and ‘welfare’ government 
spending at the 2016 values reveals a stronger relationship between real GDP and health and 
education spending than real GDP and ‘productive’ capital spending, consistent with the 
findings of e.g. Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008).  The average output elasticity of fiscal spending 
in the three regions for general government spending  is, 1.07, 1.16, and 1.32 respectively and 
the equivalent elasticity for ‘productive’ spending and ‘welfare’ spending is, 1.1, 1.1, and 0.9; 
and 1.3,1.3, and 2.0 respectively (how these elasticities are derived is shown in the Appendix). 
Overall, the results in Table 5 suggest three important findings. There is evidence of geo-
regional convergence clubs. First, provinces within each of the three regions as traditionally 
defined by government appear to share steady-state features, reflected in the estimates for 𝛾1 
and 𝛾2. Second, there is regional heterogeneity of short-run club-convergence rates, augmented 
by provincial government spending (𝜆2, 𝜅1 and 𝜅2). Third, total, ‘productive’ and health and 
education spending by local governments all appear to increase the convergence rate in a 
manner heterogeneous across the three regions. However, contrary to the predictions of models 
influential among local government officials (see Yin and Zhu, 2012), health and education 
spending has a stronger effect on both growth and convergence, even over the short-run with 
the adopted lag-length of two years21. Furthermore, total provincial government spending, 
‘productive’ spending and spending on health and education are all positively associated with 
future growth in provincial real GDP per capita (𝜆1)
22. 
Moving on to the modelling of the long run, the year-to-year volatility in growth and its drivers 
is smoothed by taking 5-year averages of available data points to construct five averaged data 
 
20  Estimating both types of fiscal spending together renders ‘productive’ spending insignificant due to 
collinearity. Greater precision is obtained from estimating the effects of each type of spending separately, as 
reported. 
21 In contrast, Lee et al. (2019) find a positive effect on growth from government spending on capital projects and 
health but a negative effect from spending on education.  
22 Interestingly, Zhu et al. (2014) argue that the one child policy (OCP) has resulted in greater investment in 
education and human capital development sustaining China’s high growth rate which would be 4% less by 2025 
in the absence of the OCP.    
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points for each variable in each province23. Independent variables are constructed similarly. 
The lag value of log real GDP per capita that captures convergence is taken as the first year of 
each five-year spell used in calculating the 5-year averages. Table 6 shows the results. 
Table 6 here 
 
 
The Table 6 results again provide robust evidence (across all specifications) for three region-
specific steady states to which province club-members converge. Results in columns 1 and 2 
for total government spending are qualitatively similar to the results in Table 5. General 
government spending has a significant province-specific effect on the long-run level of output 
per capita. Moreover, there is club convergence at regionally heterogeneous rates via the 
government spending channel. So, the estimated convergence parameters from Column 2 
evaluated at the final time-period average are -.08, -.09, and -.06 for the Coastal, Middle, and 
Western regions.  
Although some parameters appear imprecisely estimated vis-à-vis welfare spending and capital 
spending, nonetheless, results confirm earlier findings that the public sector welfare spending 
channel is more important for stimulating provincial convergence than public capital spending. 
Neither spending component exhibits a robust relationship with provincial steady state growth. 
However, particularly striking in column 6 is the significant presence of provincial 
convergence, which receives a strong additional boost via welfare spending in region 1. The 
UIT and WIT test statistics respectively reject the null hypotheses of model under-
identification and weak identification. The J statistic rejects the null of instruments validity in 
column 6 but, as stated above, UIT and WIT are the more relevant tests. 
We conduct two robustness tests regarding our results. First, we employ the pooled mean group 
estimator with cross-sectional dependence (PMGCD; Chudik and Pesaran (2015) and Chudik 
et al. (2016)) to assess the robustness of our GMM results of Table 5 vis-à-vis cross-sectional 
dependence and cross-sectional parameter heterogeneity. Second, we assess the main theme of 
our results that fiscal expenditure adds to growth and convergence for an alternative clustering 
of regions based on Tian et al. (2016). These results are discussed in the supplementary 
material. The results broadly support the finding that fiscal spending contributes to growth and 
augments convergence, but under cross-sectional dependence we do not find regional 
heterogeneity. The alternative clustering of provinces following Tian et al. (2016) also does 
not show heterogeneous convergence rates. However, while endogenous regional clusters 
based on the sample’s time series properties are interesting, they do not necessarily reflect the 
 
23 These data points are 5-year averages to 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012 respectively, and a four-year average for 
2013-2016 for the provinces with available fiscal data before 1997. For Chongqing and Sichuan fiscal data is only 
available for 1997. This gives a panel of 5x29 plus 4x2 observations in total. The smoothed data is defined such 
that 𝑋𝑇 =
1
5
(𝑋𝑡 + 𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑡−2 + 𝑋𝑡−3 + 𝑋𝑡−4). 
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fundamental properties of the data generating process24. At least, without a strong theoretical 
explanation for the clusters suggested in Tian et al. (2016) we prefer the three geo-economic 
clusters; due to their independent features, government development policy became 
differentiated explicitly across these three regions and they have, in turn, been further 
differentiated by that policy over four decades.  
  
5. Conclusion 
That provincial inequality was bound to result from spatially differentiated development policy 
was openly acknowledged by Deng Xiaoping in his Southern Tour of 1992: “If all of China is 
to become prosperous, some [areas] must get rich before others” (see e.g. World Bank, 2009). 
Nonetheless, unbalanced reforms were expected to lead to regional trickle-down rather than 
long-term divergence (Fan, 1997). 
This paper has examined the role of the composition of province-level public spending in the 
dynamics of beta-convergence in China. For data on real GDP per capita for 31 provinces in 
China over the period 1991-2016, the results show heterogeneous convergence speeds for three 
clubs with distinct steady state paths. Local public expenditure augments the club-convergence 
process both in the short- and longer-run as well as the dynamic steady state growth rate, but 
the composition of local public expenditure appears key to all this.  Specifically, our results 
suggest that the return to capital spending, in terms of boosting provincial growth and 
increasing the speed of convergence, is overstated. We find evidence that capital expenditure 
adds to provincial GDP per capita but spending on health and education has larger effects.  
Figure 8 makes clear that government spending on capital and infrastructure projects outweighs 
human capital-type public investments as a proportion of GDP in all three regions for most of 
the sample investigated here. However, the data for 2014 onwards appear to reflect a reversal 
in this pattern in all three regions. Our results suggest this is a welcome direction of travel for 
the public spending mix, and one that should be pursued actively by policymakers. 
How exactly to achieve this, given the institutional setup, is a political economy matter. Fiscal 
expenditure decentralization has fostered a political tournament among party officials who see 
their future elevation within the Communist Party as the reward for hitting economic criteria 
in the provincial economies. The selectiveness of these criteria may in turn contribute to the 
observed bias towards capital spending, the existence of which is well-recognised in the 
literature. Indeed, economic construction has been included as a specific performance target 
for local government officials in the past (Tsui and Wang, 2004). 
The over-provision of capital goods potentially creates a serious misallocation of resources. 
Under-provision of education and health goods is welfare inferior. However, the potential 
allocative inefficiency of the composition of fiscal expenditure can be viewed as rational from 
the perspective of the local government official. Spending on education and health is mostly 
 
24 Other findings using the same methodology and using a more organic level of aggregation have found 6 and 4 
convergence clubs (see Zhang, Xu and Wang, 2019, and Li et al., 2018)    
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non-discretionary and follows trends in population growth, whereas infrastructure spending is 
discretionary, high profile and immediate. Political competition for places in the upper levels 
of the party hierarchy creates the conditions for the capital bias in local public spending, unless 
promotion criteria can be adjusted to give due credit for human capital investments. 
The short to medium-run effect of public spending raises relevant questions about the sources 
of financing and the role of credit markets in funding local public sector spending. Recent work 
has highlighted the differential effect of formal against informal financing on local economic 
growth (Cheng and Degryse, 2010). The growth in shadow bank activity since 2012 has been 
linked to the overhang of the 2009 fiscal stimulus package of four trillion RMB in response to 
the Global Financial Crisis (Chen et al. 2017). Our results suggest that fiscal policy does have 
a positive effect on growth and such a stimulus package from the centre would have been 
pushing on an open door for local government. However, the implications of excessive 
infrastructure spending on the local economy and the rapid growth of the shadow banking in 
financing this expenditure are yet to be assessed. This paper has shown that, while there is a 
general perception that capital spending contributes to growth, a rebalancing of local spending 
away from physical and infrastructure capital and towards human capital investments is likely 
to yield higher local growth returns and also to increase club-convergence rates. The way for 
Central government to achieve this would be through modification of political promotion 
incentives for local officials to give credit for such human capital investments. This policy shift 
would be in keeping with State commitment to ‘Harmonious Society’ since our results suggest 
significant opportunity costs attached to a failure to invest publicly in human capital, 
particularly in western provinces, with implications for regional inequality in future. 
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Appendix 
This appendix consists of three parts: (i) robustness checks, (ii) data description, and (iii) 
construction of fiscal elasticities from parameter estimates.  
I. Robustness Checks 
We report two robustness checks vis-à-vis our results. First, we employ a pooled mean group 
estimator with cross-sectional dependence (PMGCD; Chudik and Pesaran (2015) and Chudik 
et al. (2016)) and assess if our GMM results of Table 4 are robust to cross-sectional dependence 
and parameter heterogeneity across provinces. Second, we utilise an alternative clustering of 
regions, based on Tian et al. (2016), and gauge if the main theme of our results that fiscal 
expenditure adds to growth and convergence is robust.  
The PMGCD estimator allows for inter-cluster correlations (cross-sectional dependence) 
between model variables as well as parameter heterogeneity across clusters (all provinces). 
Table A.1 summarises our results. The interesting finding from PMGCD is that while it 
supports the evidence of overall convergence showed by the GMM estimators, it also removes 
the regional heterogeneity evidenced in convergence. This is not surprising as the regional 
slope dummies that capture regional heterogeneity and the cross-sectional means of model 
variables, which enter as regressors in the PMGCD estimation to control for cross-sectional 
dependence, are likely to be highly correlated.  Two point estimates of parameters associated 
with 
2
it
it
y
p −


  and 
2
it
it
y
w −


appear very high in their magnitudes. PMGCD effectively estimates 
separate regression for each province and computes mean parameter values for the panel. Given 
that we have only 26 data points for each province and the estimator is quite demanding in 
terms of degrees of freedom because it must allow for cross-sectional dependence across model 
variables, we suggest caution regarding PMGCD results and only read them as broadly 
supporting our overall growth and convergence-augmenting effects of government’s fiscal 
policy. 
 
Table A.1 here 
 
Turning to the alternative categorisation of regional clubs, we utilize the results of Tian et al. 
(2016). In their study of regional club convergence in China, they apply the logt test of Phillips 
and Sul (2007), to identify regional clubs for data 1978-2013. They identify two clubs – a 
coastal club of eight provinces that excludes Beijing but includes Inner Mongolia and the rest. 
This classification, while novel, conflicts with the consensus categorisation derived from 
theory and past Chinese economic development policy. Indeed, other studies using the same 
method with county level data (Li et al., 2018) or prefecture level city region data (Zhang, Xu 
and Wang, 2019) find six or four convergence clubs showing no geographic regularity.  
However, given the commonality of the data used in this study and Tian et al. (2016), we can 
be confident in using the latter’s identified clusters unaltered. A zero-unity dummy variable is 
defined where D4 = 1 for a high-income club (Shanghai, Tianjin, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
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Guangdong, Shandong, Fujian, and Inner Mongolia) of Tian et al. (2016), and zero for the rest. 
Table A.2 summarises the results. 
The results from this alternative categorisation of clubs are mixed. In general, the results 
confirm the existence of a high-income club, but there is no evidence of heterogeneity in 
convergence speed. There is some evidence of homogeneous club convergence and that general 
government spending and spending on health and education aids this process. Productive 
spending appears not to play a significant part in either growth generation or convergence. 
Columns 5 and 6 confirm that spending on health and education has strong impacts on growth 
and convergence. 
 
Table A.2 here 
 
II. Data Description 
This part presents and discusses the data in more detail. Table A3 confirms the graphical 
intuition of Figure 2. In the initial period, except for a few provinces on the coast, the growth 
of GDP per capita is in the same order for all. In the second period, mostly the coastal regions 
and a few mid-central provinces race ahead. In the final period, there is a stronger catch-up 
from the non-coastal province. 
 
Table A.3 here 
 
Table A4 presents the definitions of the constituent components of public spending before and 
after the re-categorization that occurred in 2007. The shaded areas represent the data extracted 
from the public finance statements taken to represent broadly capital expenditure (before and 
after 2007) and welfare spending on health and education (before and after 2007). 
  
Table A.4 here 
 
Here a few words about the data are warranted. Total government spending at the  provincial 
level is available in a consistent manner through to 1979; however, a detailed compositional 
breakdown is only available from 1991 to 2006, when capital and infrastructure spending is 
separated in each province, as is education and health spending. However, from 2007, capital 
expenditure was distributed non-uniformly across other spending categories allowing different 
provinces to adopt local accounting conventions. Therefore, it is possible that health will 
include spending on new building that would normally be in the capital spending category pre-
2007, and education to include new construction of schools that would previously be in capital 
expenditure. We have done our best (See Table A2) to identify the relevant categories of 
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government expenditure that separate capital (production-oriented) spending from education 
and health (welfare).  
 
III. Calculation of the Fiscal Elasticities 
Let 𝑦 = 𝑙𝑛𝑌 and 𝑔 = (
𝐺
𝑌
). Here Y represents real GDP per capita, and G represents real total 
government spending per capita. 
Ignoring the subscripts {i, t}, the steady-state representation of equation (2) can be expressed 
as; 
𝛼0 + 𝛾1𝐷1 + 𝛾2𝐷2 + 𝛽1𝑦 + 𝜆1𝑔 + (𝜆2 + 𝜅1𝐷1 + 𝜅2𝐷2)𝑔𝑦  = 0               (A.1) 
Totally differentiating expression A.1we have; 
0 = β1dy + λ1dg + (λ2 + κ1D1 + κ2D2)[(y)dg + (g)dy] 
                                                          
dy
dg
= −
λ1+(𝜆2+𝜅1𝐷1+𝜅2𝐷2)𝑦
β1+(𝜆2+𝜅1𝐷1+𝜅2𝐷2)𝑔
 = φ1   (A.2) 
Expressing A.2 as below and multiplying both sides by 𝑔 = (
𝐺
𝑌
), gives A.3 
dlnY
d(
G
Y
)
= φ1                                          
dlnY
d(
G
Y
)/(
G
Y
)
= φ1 (
G
Y
) = φ2                       A.3 
dlnY
dlnG − dlnY
= φ2 
dlnG − dlnY
dlnY
=
1
φ2
 
dlnG
dlnY
− 1 =
1
φ2
 
dlnG
dlnY
=
1
φ2
+ 1  
Therefore, the elasticity is given by the expression A.4 
dlnY
dlnG
=
φ2
1+φ2
          A.4 
 
Expression A.4 can be evaluated for corresponding values of {y, g}.  We arrive at our 
estimates by first using the results of column 2 of Table 5 and calculating the elasticities for 
each province using the 2016 values for {yi, gi} for each province and then take the average 
for each region. 
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Figure 1: Coastal, Middle and Western Regions of China 
 
 
  
 
Figure 2: Real GDP per capita (Yuan, 1978 prices) 
 Panel A      Panel B 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3a: Average Real GDP per capita                Figure 3b: Average government spending 
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Figure 4: Standard deviation of log real GDP per capita 1978-2016 
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Figure 5: Sigma Costal Region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Sigma Mid-Central Region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Sigma Western Region 
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Figure 8: Provincial public spending and its key components as proportion of province GDP, 
averaged across provinces in region. Panel A shows coastal region averages; Panel B shows 
mid region averages; Panel C shows the west region averages. 
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Table 1: Provincial Inequality in China since 1978. Real GDP per capita in 1978 Yuan by 
province, rows ordered by the ratio to the Shanghai level in 1978 from largest to smallest.25  
Province Region 1978 
level 
Ratio to 
Shanghai, 
1978 
Ratio to 
Shanghai, 
1990 
Ratio to 
Shanghai, 
2016 
Average 
Growth of real 
GDP per 
capita 1978-
1990 (fraction) 
Average 
Growth of real 
GDP per 
capita 1990-
2016 (fraction) 
Shanghai Coastal 2485 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.06 0.09 
Beijing Coastal 1257 0.51 0.59 0.45 0.07 0.08 
Tianjin Coastal 1133 0.46 0.46 0.72 0.06 0.11 
Liaoning Coastal 680 0.27 0.30 0.35 0.07 0.09 
Heilongjiang Middle 564 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.06 0.09 
Jiangsu Coastal 430 0.17 0.27 0.56 0.10 0.12 
Qinghai Western 428 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.07 0.09 
Jilin Middle 381 0.15 0.19 0.28 0.08 0.10 
Tibet Western 375 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.06 0.10 
Guangdong Coastal 370 0.15 0.26 0.38 0.11 0.10 
Ningxia Western 370 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.07 0.09 
Shanxi Middle 365 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.08 0.09 
Hebei Coastal 364 0.15 0.16 0.24 0.07 0.10 
Gansu Western 348 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.07 0.10 
Hubei Middle 332 0.13 0.17 0.28 0.08 0.11 
Zhejiang Coastal 331 0.13 0.23 0.41 0.11 0.11 
In Mongolia Western 317 0.13 0.17 0.39 0.08 0.12 
Shandong Coastal 316 0.13 0.17 0.35 0.09 0.12 
Hainan Coastal 314 0.13 0.20 0.27 0.10 0.10 
Xinjiang Western 313 0.13 0.18 0.16 0.09 0.08 
Shaanxi Western 291 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.08 0.11 
Hunan Middle 286 0.12 0.12 0.17 0.06 0.10 
Jiangxi Middle 276 0.11 0.13 0.18 0.07 0.10 
Fujian Coastal 273 0.11 0.17 0.34 0.10 0.12 
Sichuan Western 261 0.11 0.13 0.21 0.08 0.11 
Chongqing Western 269 0.11 0.13 0.27 0.08 0.12 
Anhui Middle 244 0.10 0.12 0.20 0.08 0.11 
Henan Middle 232 0.09 0.13 0.20 0.08 0.11 
Yunnan Western 226 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.09 
Guanxi Western 225 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.05 0.10 
Guizhou Western 175 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.10 
 
25 As neoclassical theory predicts, among the slowest growing provinces for 1990-2016 are Beijing and Shanghai, the two 
richest provinces in 1978, while some initially poorer provinces register high growth rates (e.g. Inner Mongolia). However, as 
Table 1 illustrates, the general relationship between initial income and growth is more complex. Jiangsu and Qinghai are 
interesting examples: in 1978, they were side by side in the income distribution with 430 and 428 Yuan per capita respectively 
(7th and 8th richest in the distribution, though just 17% of the income per capita of Shanghai). However, by 1990, Jiangsu on 
the coast had 27% of the income per capita of Shanghai, while Qinghai had 19%. Between 1990 and 2016, Jiangsu grew on 
average at 12 per cent while Qinghai in the western region grew at 9%. 
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Table 2: Variable Definitions and summary statistics; 1991-2016 
Variable Definition Obs Mean SD Min Max 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 Change in log real GDP per 
capita, 1978 prices 
806 .097 .030 -.034 .329 
𝑦𝑖90 log real GDP per capita in 
1990 
31 6.83 .520 6.023 8.495 
Log real GDP per capita, 1978 prices (By region) 
𝑦𝑖t 
Coast 286 8.698 0.866 6.765 10.675 
Mid 208 7.902 0.785 6.352 9.399 
West 312 7.753 0.804 6.098 9.725 
 Total 806 8.127 0.926 6.098 10.675 
Total government spending as proportion of GDP (By region) 
𝑔𝑖t 
Coast 286 .126 .053 .049 .340 
Mid 208 .146 .052 .062 .275 
West 302 .278 .214 .075 1.379 
 Total 796 .189 .155 .049 1.379 
Notes: Real GDP per capita in 1978 prices for each province sourced from The Comprehensive Statistical 
Materials on 60 Years of New China and China Statistical Yearbook.  
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Table 3: Fiscal Policy Measures, ratio of local GDP. Average values 1991-2016 
Variable Definition Mean SD Min Max 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 Public spending on capital 
projects (All provinces)  
.028 .034 .003 .334 
 Coast .018 .011 .003 .066 
 Mid .016 .008 .004 .037 
 West .048 .052 .007 .333 
𝑤𝑖𝑡 Public spending on welfare 
(health and education) (All) 
.046 .032 .001 .258 
 Coast .030 .013 .011 .090 
 Mid .036 .015 .010 .076 
 West .067 .041 .001 .258 
𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑡 Transfers from Centre, including 
tax rebate* (All) 0.115 0.154 0.017 1.297 
  
Coast .044 .028 .017 .165 
  
Mid .082 .032 .027 .180 
  
West .202 .218 .031 1.297 
Notes: Central fiscal transfer and tax rebate data taken from the China Finance Year Book. *Transfer measures 
(including tax rebate and discretionary transfers) are for 1994-2016 
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Table 4: Results from Baseline Convergence Estimates (1991-2016) 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝐷1 + 𝛾2𝐷2 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝜑1𝐷1 ∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝜑2𝐷2 ∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
                     Homogeneous Regional Heterogeneity 
 1 2 3 4 
Regressors OLS GMM OLS GMM 
 Constant 0.070*** 
(0.007) 
0.049*** 
(0.008) 
0.041*** 
(0.008) 
0.037*** 
(0.008) 
1ity −   
0.684*** 
(0.032) 
0.661*** 
(0.058) 
0.658*** 
(0.033) 
0.646*** 
(0.058) 
1D   
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.072*** 
(0.015) 
0.026** 
(0.014) 
2D   
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.01) 
0.016* 
(0.010) 
0.017 
(0.012) 
2ity −   
-0.005*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.0004 
(0.001) 
1 2* itD y −  
- - -0.008*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.002) 
2 2* itD y −  
- - -0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
2R   0.524 0.591 0.533 0.592 
UIT (
2 (3) )  
- [0.000]*** - [0.000] *** 
WIT (F(3,29)  [0.000] *** - [0.000] *** 
J statistic  [0.266] - [0.149] 
Obs 837 744 837 744 
Notes: (.) are standard errors of parameters and [.] denotes P-values of test statistic under null. Superscripts ***, 
**, * respectively denote significance at one, five and ten percent levels. For efficient two-step GMM estimates 
in columns 2 and 4, three lags of the lagged dependent variable are used as instruments, providing two over-
identifying restrictions for each. UIT and WIT test statistics respectively denote Sanderson-Windmeijer (2015) 
tests of under-identification and weak identification in the model. Since we have only one endogenous regressor, 
these tests are equivalent to Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk-Wald statistic which is cluster-robust. Significant UIT and 
WIT respectively reject the null of model un-identification and under-identification. J Statistic of Hansen (1982) 
is the over-identifying restriction test. The null of J statistic is that all (excluded and included) instruments are 
valid i.e. satisfy the exogeneity assumption. 1D  and 2D  are impulse dummy variables taking a value of unity for 
regions one (coastal) and two (mid-central), respectively, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined as in 
Tables 2 & 3. 
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Table 5: Fiscal Policy and Convergence 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝐷1 + 𝛾2𝐷2 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝜆1𝐸𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝜆2𝐸𝑖𝑡−2 ∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝜅1𝐷1 ∗ 𝐸𝑖𝑡−2
∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝜅2𝐷2 ∗ 𝐸𝑖𝑡−2 ∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      
 Total government 
spending 
Productive spending Welfare spending 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Regressors OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
 Constant 0.055*** 
(0.015) 
-0.017 
(0.014) 
0.063*** 
(0.012) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.015 
(0.015) 
-0.025* 
(0.014) 
1ity −   
0.674*** 
(0.031) 
0.639*** 
(0.061) 
0.638*** 
(0.050) 
0.658*** 
(0.061) 
0.692*** 
(0.051) 
0.635*** 
(0.060) 
1D   
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.001*** 
(0.004) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
2D   
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.014*** 
(0.003) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
2ity −   
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.004** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
2itE −   0.037 
(0.056) 
0.268*** 
(0.067) 
- - - - 
2 2*it itE y− −  -0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.032*** 
(0.008) 
- - - - 
1 2 2* *it itD E y− −  -0.007
*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
- - - - 
2 2 2* *it itD E y− −  -0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
- - - - 
2itp −   
- - 0.045 
(0.088) 
0.177*** 
(0.051) 
- - 
𝑝𝑖𝑡−2 ∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 - - -0.006 
(0.010) 
-0.023*** 
(0.006) 
- - 
𝐷1 ∗ 𝑝𝑖𝑡−2
∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 
- - -0.014*** 
(0.005) 
-0.021*** 
(0.006) 
- - 
𝐷2 ∗ 𝑝𝑖𝑡−2
∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 
- - -0.023*** 
(0.005) 
-0.029*** 
(0.006) 
- - 
2itw −   
    1.121*** 
(0.316) 
1.450*** 
(0.361) 
2 2*it itw y− −  
    -0.144*** 
(0.037) 
-0.173*** 
(0.036) 
1 2 2* *it itD w y− −  
    -0.033*** 
(0.007) 
-0.036*** 
(0.008) 
2 2 2* *it itD w y− −  
    -0.031*** 
(0.009) 
-0.035*** 
(0.009) 
2R  0.529 0.601 0.498 0.603 0.610 0.605 
UIT (
2 (3)
) 
- [0.001] 
*** 
- [0.000] *** - [0.000***] 
WIT-Pvalue - [0.000] 
*** 
- [0.000] *** - [0.000] *** 
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J statistic - [0.103] - [0.035] ** - [0.173] 
Obs 821 734 760 734 734 734 
Notes:  Diagnostics and dummy variables are as defined in Table 4. Rest of the variables are defined as in 
Tables 2 and 3. 
 
 
Table 6: Growth and convergence with fiscal expenditures (5-year averages) 
∆𝑦𝑖?̃?  = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝐷1 + 𝜃2𝐷2 + 𝜃3𝐸𝑖?̃? + 𝜃4𝑦𝑖𝑡−5 + 𝜃5𝐸𝑖?̃?𝑦𝑖𝑡−5 + 𝜃6𝐷1𝐸𝑖?̃?𝑦𝑖𝑡−5 
+𝜃7𝐷2𝐸𝑖?̃?𝑦𝑖𝑡−5 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
 Total government 
spending 
Productive spending Welfare spending 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Regressors OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
Constant .048 
(0.033) 
.122* 
(.068) 
.128*** 
(.031) 
0.275*** 
(0.041) 
.057* 
(.034) 
.224*** 
(.054) 
D1 .032*** 
(.010) 
.022** 
(.011) 
.018** 
(.008) 
0.011 
(0.011) 
.040** 
(.015) 
.047*** 
(.016) 
D2 .019** 
(.008) 
.037*** 
(.014) 
.019*** 
(.007) 
0.025** 
(0.010) 
.017 
(.011) 
.031* 
(.016) 
𝐸𝑖?̃? .271
*** 
(.084) 
0.519** 
(.261) 
- - - - 
𝑦𝑡−5 .005 
(.004) 
-.003 
(.009) 
-.005 
(.004) 
-0.021*** 
(0.005) 
.003 
(.004) 
-.016 *** 
(.006) 
𝐸𝑖𝑇 ∗̃ 𝑦𝑡−5 -.032
*** 
(.010) 
-.062** 
(.031) 
- - - - 
𝐷1 ∗ 𝐸𝑖?̃? ∗ 𝑦𝑡−5 -.027
** 
(.010) 
-.019** 
(.007) 
- - - - 
𝐷2 ∗ 𝐸𝑖?̃? ∗ 𝑦𝑡−5 -.013
** 
(.006) 
-
.025*** 
(.009) 
- - - - 
𝑝𝑖?̃? - - .047 
(.462) 
0. 260 
(0.677) 
  
𝑝𝑖?̃? ∗ 𝑦𝑡−5 - - .001 
(.059) 
-0.031 
(0.082) 
  
𝐷1 ∗ 𝑝𝑖?̃? ∗ 𝑦𝑡−5   -.067
* 
(.039) 
0.010 
(0.038) 
  
𝐷2 ∗ 𝑝𝑖?̃? ∗ 𝑦𝑡−5   -.101
** 
(.039) 
-.125*** 
(0.044) 
  
𝑤𝑖?̃? -  - - 1.25
*** 
(.427) 
.921 
(0.764) 
𝑤𝑖?̃? ∗ 𝑦𝑡−5 -  - - -.138
*** 
(.047) 
-.106 
(.089) 
𝐷1 ∗ 𝑤𝑖?̃? ∗ 𝑦𝑡−5    - -.105
** 
(.047) 
-.083** 
(.039) 
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𝐷2 ∗ 𝑤𝑖?̃? ∗ 𝑦𝑡−5    - -.030 
(.026) 
-.052 
(.036) 
R2 .193 .408 .104 .390  .178 .400 
UIT(
2 (3)
) 
 .000***  .011**  0.000*** 
WIT-Pvalue  .000***  .002***  0.000*** 
J statistic  . 096  0.596  0.004*** 
Obs. 153 91 153 91 153 91 
Dependant variable 𝑖𝑠 ∆𝑦𝑖?̃? =
1
5
(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡−5). 𝐸𝑖?̃?  indicates 5-year average, starting at time t-4.  For GMM results 
in column 2 the first and second order lagged values of  𝑔𝑖?̃?   and the second order lag of average openness are 
used as instruments. Likewise, for column 4, the first and the second order lagged values of 𝑝𝑖?̃?  and the second 
order lag of openness are used. For column 6, the first and the second order lags of  𝑤𝑖?̃?  and the second order lag 
of openness are used. For variable definitions, please refer to notes to Tables 4 and 5. 
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Tables for Appendix 
 
Table A.1: Pooled Mean Group Estimator with Cross-Sectional Dependence (31 Provinces) 
 1 2 3 
Regressors Total Govt Spending Productive Spending Welfare Spending 
Constant -.484***  
(.167) 
-.355***  
(.099) 
-.484*** 
(.153) 
1ity −  
.175**  
(.090) 
-.324**    
(.121) 
-.081 
(.127) 
2ity −   
-.348**  
(.107) 
-.545***  
(.131) 
-.546*** 
(.108) 
2itg −   
2.922**  
(1.40) 
- - 
2 2*it itg y− −  
-.076* (.041) - - 
1 2 2* *it itD g y− −  
-.227    
(.153) 
- - 
2 2 2* *it itD g y− −  
-.071   
(.068) 
- - 
2itp −   
 3.067 
(2.078) 
- 
2 1*it itp y− −  
 -.289 
(.241) 
- 
1 2 1* *it itD p y− −  
 # - 
2 2 1* *it itD p y− −  
 # - 
2itw −   
 - 9. 787*** 
(3.466) 
2 2*it itw y− −  
 - -.204 (.180) 
1 2 2* *it itD w y− −  
 - -.511 
(.333) 
2 2 2* *it itD w y− −  
 - -.336** 
(.166) 
2R  .710 .720 .720 
Obs 790 712 703 
   Dependent variable is 
ity . # Parameters of regional variations in convergence vis-à-vis 
productive spending could not be computed under Mean Group Cross-sectional Dependence 
Estimator due to their high collinearity with cross-sectional means, which appear as regressors. 
For details please refer to the notes to Table 4 in the main text.  
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Table A.2: Fiscal Policy and Convergence with alternative club classification. Standard errors 
in parenthesis (31 Provinces) 
 Total government 
spending 
Productive spending Welfare spending 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Regressors OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
 Constant .068*** 
(.012) 
.029* 
(.015) 
.086*** 
(.013) 
.054*** 
(.010) 
.015 
(.016) 
.014 
(.017) 
1ity −   
.674*** 
(.033) 
.655*** 
(.065) 
.630*** 
(.049) 
.648*** 
(.062) 
.689*** 
(.058) 
.647*** 
(.065) 
2ity −   
-.005*** 
(.001) 
.000 
(.02) 
-.006*** 
(.001) 
-.003*** 
(.001) 
.001 
(.002) 
.002 
(.002) 
𝐷4 .011
*** 
(.003) 
.005 
(.004) 
.008** 
(.004) 
.005 
(.003) 
.009** 
(.004) 
.011*** 
(.004) 
2itg −   
.009 
(.046) 
.197*** 
(.061) 
-  - - 
2 2*it itg y− −  
-.001 
(,005) 
-.023*** 
(.007) 
-  - - 
𝐷4 ∗ 𝑔𝑖𝑡−2 ∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 -.003 
(.003) 
.000 
(.004) 
-  - - 
2itp −   
- - -.017 
(.095) 
.083* 
(.043) 
- - 
2 1*it itp y− −  
- - .002 
(.012) 
-.011** 
(.004) 
- - 
𝐷4 ∗ 𝑝𝑖𝑡−2 ∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 - - -.001 
(.006) 
.002 
(.005) 
- - 
2itw −   
- - -  1.025*** 
(.313) 
1.166*** 
(.277) 
2 2*it itw y− −  
- - -  -.121*** 
(.035) 
-.137*** 
(.033) 
𝐷4 ∗ 𝑤𝑖𝑡−2 ∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 - - -  -.019 
(.014) 
-.023 
(.015) 
2R  0.532 0.601 0.499 0.596 0.606 0.604 
UIT-Pvalue - [0.000]**
* 
- [0.000]*** - [0.000]*** 
WIT-Pvalue - [0.000]**
* 
- [0.000]*** - [0.000]*** 
J statistic - [0.432] - [0.421] - [0.372] 
Obs 821 734 760 734 760 734 
See notes to Table 4 in the main text. 
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Table A.3: Growth of real GDP per capita by province, 1978-2016 
Province Region 1978-
1990 
1990-
2006 
2006-
2012 
2013-
2016 
1978-2016 
Beijing Coast 6.9 8.5 5.4 5.4 7.2 
Tianjin Coast 5.7 10.7 10.7 6.8 8.7 
Hebei Coast 6.5 10.9 9.6 6.2 8.8 
Liaoning Coast 6.5 9.4 11.5 3.7 8.2 
Shanghai Coast 5.6 9.6 6.6 6.3 7.5 
Jiangsu Coast 9.2 12.2 10.9 8.0 10.6 
Zhejiang Coast 10.0 12.4 8.5 7.1 10.5 
Fujian Coast 9.3 11.6 11.5 8.3 10.5 
Shandong Coast 6.7 12.7 11.3 7.5 10.2 
Guangdong Coast 10.1 11.2 8.6 6.8 10.0 
Hainan Coast 9.6 9.6 10.5 7.2 9.5 
Jilin Mid 7.5 9.3 13.1 6.8 9.1 
Heilongjiang Mid 5.5 8.3 11.0 6.3 7.7 
Shanxi Mid 6.4 9.6 9.1 4.7 8.0 
Anhui Mid 7.4 9.9 12.8 8.1 9.4 
Jiangxi Mid 7.1 9.2 11.3 8.5 8.8 
Henan Mid 8.1 10.4 11.3 7.9 9.5 
Hubei Mid 7.7 9.9 12.5 8.4 9.4 
Hunan Mid 6.0 9.3 11.7 7.9 8.5 
Guanxi West 5.1 9.9 11.7 7.4 8.4 
In Mongolia West 7.9 11.7 14.2 7.3 10.4 
Sichuan West 7.6 10.4 13.7 7.4 9.8 
Guizhou West 7.3 7.8 12.5 10.1 8.6 
Yunnan West 7.7 7.9 11.0 8.4 8.4 
Tibet West 5.5 9.8 10.4 8.7 8.4 
Shaanxi West 7.4 9.4 13.0 8.3 9.2 
Gansu West 6.4 8.7 10.7 8.1 8.3 
Qinghai West 6.4 7.9 11.2 7.8 7.9 
Ningxia West 6.6 7.6 10.5 7.1 7.7 
Xinjiang West 8.6 7.7 8.9 7.2 8.1 
Chongqing West 7.5 11.1 14.4 9.9 10.3 
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Table A.4.  Provincial Public Spending Categories in China 
    
Before the budget accounts 
reform in 2007  
After budget accounts 
reform in 2007 
Total 
Expenditure 
Maintenance 
Spending 
Expenditure for National 
Defence 
Expenditure for 
National Defence 
Expenditure for 
Government 
Administration 
Expenditure for 
General Public Service  
Expenditure for Foreign 
Affairs 
Expenditure for 
Foreign Affairs 
Expenditure for Armed 
Police Troops 
Expenditure for Public 
Security 
Expenditure for Public 
Security Agency 
Procuratorial Agency and 
Court of Justice 
  
Expenditure for Specified 
Underdeveloped Areas 
  
Productive 
Spending 
Expenditure for Capital 
Construction 
  
Expenditure for Innovation 
Enterprises 
Expenditure for 
Science and 
Technology Promotion 
Expenditure for Geological 
Prospecting 
Expenditure for 
Geological Prospecting 
Expenditure for Science 
and Technology Promotion 
Expenditure for Interest 
of Public Debt 
Expenditure for Circulating 
Funds 
Expenditure for 
Expense of Bond 
Issuing 
Expenditure for Supporting 
Agriculture Production 
Expenditure for Food 
Production Security 
Expenditure for 
Comprehensive 
Development of 
Agriculture 
Expenditure for 
Country Land and 
Ocean Preservation 
Expenditure for Operating 
Expenses of Agriculture，
Expenditure for 
Agriculture，
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Forestry，Water 
Conservancy and 
Meteorology 
Forestry，Water 
Conservancy and 
Meteorology 
Expenditure for Operating 
Expenses of Departments 
of Industry & 
Transportation 
Expenditure for 
Industry and    
Transportation 
Expenditure for Operating 
Expenses of Department of 
Commerce 
Expenditure for 
Commerce 
Expenditure for City 
Maintenance 
Expenditure for 
Banking Finance 
Expenditure for Price 
Subsidies 
  
Expenditure for 
Developing Land and Sea 
Area 
Expenditure for 
Developing Land and 
Sea Area 
Expenditure for Special 
Items 
Expenditure for 
Housing 
Other Expenditure Other Expenditure 
Welfare 
Spending 
Expenditure for Operating 
Expenses of Departments 
of Culture，Sport & 
Broadcasting 
Expenditure for 
Culture, Sports and 
Media 
Expenditure for Culture, 
Education & Health 
Expenditure for 
Education & Health 
Expenditure for Operating 
Expenses of Department of 
Science 
Expenditure for Energy 
Saving and 
Environment Protection 
     
Notes: The public budgetary account experienced a major reform in 2007. In order to bridge the data of budget 
items throughout the reform, we follow the instruction in Manual of government budgetary accounts reform of 
the Ministry of Finance, China. 
 
 
 
